Punishing a Gifted Lawyer, for Exposing Exploitive Patterns in the Legal Profession
Your writer has appeared in bankruptcy court from to time, from admission to practice in 1974 forward. This included chapter 7s and 11’s, on behalf of debtors and creditors, and adversary proceedings. He had some concerns, about the cartel trading paper until the estates were gone.
After a chapter 13 reorganization ran its course, he distributed a flyer in 2009, Stop the Plunder in Bankruptcy Court. Appendix 5. The flyer relied on nationwide criticism of the cartel by bankruptcy fee experts and other commentators; my own scholarship; and first hand observation. The Supreme Court disciplinary commission wrote to me about the flyer, and deadfiled it in January, 2010.
Before and after photos of the local project used as an example are Appendix 11.
In September 2010 I distributed Drydock Mourdock, which took several major state officers to task over excessive fees paid to an out of state law firm, and renewed criticism of the heavily jewish bankruptcy cartel. Appendix 6.
The front and back of the T-shirt worn while distributing both flyers is Appendix 12.
Unbeknown to me, as of the June, 2010 turnover of disciplinary officers, at least half of the 4 executive committee members were jewish, with a jewish law firm or both (Ms Grinsfelder and Ms Zweig) and maybe a 3rd, Mr. Austerman. We also had a Ms Nestrick, with a a jewish law firm, and Mr. Zappia, a question at this point, out of the total of 9 commissioners.
In January of 2011, the commission (appointed entirely by the Court) filed a formal disciplinary complaint based on Stop the Plunder and some 5 year old appeal briefs, which raised exploitive behavior toward their clients by a law firm, mentioned in both flyers. The appeal briefs did not address anything jewish. They did use psychological terms, in an attempt to fathom (1) the grandiose bills, and (2) the apparent exploitation of the firm’s clients, who may have had “diminished capacity. ” Any attempt at “diagnosis” was disavowed.
The complaint said insubstance that the flyers and briefs were frivolous, in bad faith, and biased. Appendix 8, p 2.
The strongest language in Stop the Plunder referred to bloodsucking, which wiktionary.org defines as “taking as much as possible from others.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines a bloodsucker as a person who lives off others or extorts, or a parasite.
The evidence of that behavior was overwhelming here, both in the local example and as a long running concern; Jewish domination of the bankruptcy cartel is historic (“as jewish as kosher butchering”, according to a column in Jewishjournal.com); and the exploitive language of Talmud and the old testament is explicit. See deism.com/jewish superiority.
As to currency of the exploitive views (in addition to examples in Stop the Plunder) see comments of Sephardic Jewish Leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef in 1999 and 2010, about the goyim as donkeys here to serve jews. His remarks were condemned, but as many as one fourth (250,000 to 800,000) of the nonsecular jews in Israel attended his 2014 funeral, possibly the greatest ingathering since the Second Temple.
See also “Revisiting Professional Fees in Chapter 11 Cases”, Journal of Business Technology, 2010. The author, Nancy Rapaport, a Stanford Law grad, is a chaired professor of bankruptcy law and ethics at UNLV, who has often testified in bankruptcy fee disputes. She originally titled it “Pornographic Overstaffing.” (ftnote 11).
Legal Standard
The burden of proof in an Indiana disciplinary case is clear and convincing, not just a preponderance. Under the First Amendment, speech in a public forum may not be punished without a compelling state interest, and a rule or ordinance must be narrowly written to achieve that interest.
The US Supreme Court has explained that a lawyer may not be punished for speech, that does not present a clear and present danger, or substantial likelihood of material prejudice to a pending proceeding. Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1039 (1991).
A lawyer’s first amendment rights are less than the general public, only if his speech is likely to impair conflicting constitutional rights of parties in pending proceedings, to a fair trial. ”At the very least, our cases recognize that disciplinary rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First Amendment, and that First Amendment protection survives even when the attorney violates a disciplinary rule he swore to obey when admitted to the practice of law. We have not in recent years accepted our colleagues’ apparent theory that the practice of law brings with it comprehensive restrictions, or that we will defer to professional bodies when those restrictions impinge upon First Amendment freedoms.” Gentile, id, at 1054.
If the lawyer criticizes a public official, he may be punished only if the accuser establishes that the utterance was false, and made with knowledge of its falsity, or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true. That is true, whether the action against the lawyer is criminal or civil. New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U. S. 279-280, and Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64 at 74.
How the Case Went
The Court initially named an of counsel lawyer with Krieg De Vault as the hearing officer! My file marked response was not logged in until I filed a motion 20 days later to compel logging, a first for me.
The new hearing officer, Justin Hunter of Clinton County Superior Court, blocked virtually all discovery, directed at unprivileged communication with the clients, leading to the exorbitant fees; definition of anti-semiticism; any of the scholarship directed at jewish history and religion (“legitimate advocacy”); and how comments after a case was over could be “in a professional capacity” (under Disc Rule 8.4 [g]) when all the Indiana cases to date conformed to the recent pattern in US Supreme Court cases, giving lawyers the same First Amendment rights as anyone else, once a case is over.
Clinton is the only county that touches both a home county of Krieg De Vault (Hamilton) and the home county of the Supreme Court’s disciplinary liasson at the time (Dickson, Tippecanoe). Hunter is another IU-Indpls law graduate, and I have been unable to find indicators of strong ability.
As to nonprivileged communication, Krieg De Vault managing partner Hittle explained during deposition of partner Ms Lehman, “This isn’t about what we did. This is about punishing you!” For what? Criticizing what they did, and a value system likely in play.
All discovery aimed at prosecutorial motive (jewish configuration of the commission) was also blocked. Think of the fraud of Nuremberg, so characterized by Chief Justice Stone; aggressive corruption of the Warren Commission’s work by a heavily jewish staff, after assassination of a president, marked by Ben Gurion as a threat to Israel’s survival; and Abe Fortas’ resignation under pressure. Also, the bogus “formal inquiries” into the 1967 USS Liberty war crimes; gross corruption of the 9/11 Commission’s work under executive director Zelikow; blocking discovery and bottling up of first responder Rodriguez’ suit by the federal courts; release of the 5 “dancing Israeli’s” by Zionist US Attorney General Michael Mukasey; and the Guantanamo proceedings, written off essentially as a fraud by 5 chief prosecutors. See gentileassociation.org under the courts, and under JFK and the Warren Commission.
Mark Massa, who was general counsel to Governor Daniels when the $2 mil addressed in Drydock Mourdock was paid, and who was appointed to the bench by Daniels in April, 2012, denied a motion to recuse himself.
Pointing to no false assertions in the scholarship; refusing to define anti-Semitism (vs legitimate criticism); and denying a First Amendment issue was even in play (note Dickson’s C in constitutional law, at Purdue); Dickson decreed “virulent bigotry” and “a history of unethical litigation practices”, and imposed a three year suspension. The May 8, 2013 Indpls Star article is Appendix 7, and the May 2 opinion under cause no. 49S00-1101-DI 5 is Appendix 8.
The online version of the May 8 article omits all of my observations included in the hard copy, about free speech, and exploitive patterns in the heavily jewish bankruptcy courts. See discussion under zionist manipulation, about massive CIA/Mossad clout in the media, negatively branding anyone who exposes them.
Note the suspended lawyer served on the ICLU screening committee (before it became ACLU-Indiana and substituted a screening czar); has represented people pursuing age, race and sex discrimination claims; and served several years as an officer of the Indianapolis Peace and Justice Center.
It may well require several lawyers with strong intellects and experience, willing to put their licenses at risk, to get this problem effectively addressed. The right of the public to hear from those who should know must come first in a democracy.
More First Amendment Law
The First Amendment opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court drive home again and again the point of Noam Chomsky, recipient of 39 honorary degrees:
“If we do not believe in freedom of speech for those we despise then we do not believe in it at all.”
“Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment.” Rehnquist, J in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network W. New York, 519 U.S. 357, syllabus.
“…if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea, simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 414 (1989), over the opinion element of burning a flag. In RAV v City of St Paul (1992), the court held a a party burning a cross in someone’s front yard could be charged for arson or criminal trespass, but not for expression of opinion.
“The remedy is more free speech–battling evil counsels with good ones.” Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 375-77 (1927).
Speech “may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.” Terminiello v City of Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949).
Criticizing Jews
Terminiello sharply criticized jews before a huge and unruly crowd, but his speech was protected. He condemned the Morgenthau Plan to starve German babies and pregnant women, and said “Now, let me say, I am going to talk about—I almost said, about the Jews. Of course, I would not want to say that. However, I am going to talk about some Jews. I hope that—I am a Christian minister. We must take a Christian attitude. I don’t want you to go from this hall with hatred in your heart for any person, for no person. ..
Now, this danger which we face—let us call them Zionist Jews if you will, let’s call them atheistic, communistic Jewish or Zionist Jews, then let us not fear to condemn them. You remember the Apostles when they went into the upper room after the death of the Master, they went in there, after locking the doors; they closed the windows…..
So, my friends, since we spent much time tonight trying to quiet the howling mob, I am going to bring my thoughts to a conclusion, and the conclusion is this. We must all be like the Apostles before the coming of the Holy Ghost. We must not lock ourselves in an upper room for fear of the Jews. I speak of the Communistic Zionistic Jew, and those are not American Jews. We don’t want them here; we want them to go back where they came from….”
As the court stated, the speaker ” vigorously, if not viciously, criticized various political and racial groups…” but all 9 justices, including Frankfurter, found his speech was protected.
The 4 dissents were all based on failure of the speaker to preserve appealable error in the record, in a case over a small fine. As they pointed out, the court almost never agreed to hear small cases, where no appealable record had been preserved. One Justice, Jackson, also felt the serious outbreaks of mob violence at the scene constituted the type of “clear and present danger” that warranted a citation. One might note, Jackson was the least educated judge on the court (no college, one year of law school at Albany) and the only one who joined the charades at Nuremberg. Even Jackson acknowledged “any American citizen may go far, in expressing views that are pro- emitic or anti-semitic, pro-negro or anti-negro, pro-Catholic or anti-Catholic… this process of reaching intelligent popular decisions requires free discussion. Hence we should tolerate no law or custom of censorship or suppression” (emphasis ours).
There is a strong parallel between The Great Sedition Trials, and the disciplinary order at hand. There is also a parallel to recent browbeatings by the heavily jewish major “news” media, of people who criticize the “international jews” so sharply condemned by Churchill, and earlier by Franklin. Franklin predicted an American revolution, when the King forced our states and banks back under the yoke of the international financiers, in 1765. There is another parallel to browbeating by the same “news” media of Mel Gibson, for criticizing the role of jews, in triggering wars.
Regarding speech by lawyers, in addition to Gentile
“The First Amendment’s protection of association prohibits a State from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him solely because he is a member of a particular political organization or because he holds certain beliefs. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266, 88 S.Ct. 419, 425, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607, 87 S.Ct. 675, 686, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967).”
The practice of law is not a matter of grace. Baird v. State Bar, 401 US 1, 8 (1971), and Schware v. Bd of Law Examiners, 353 US 232, 239 n. 5.
The Gentile court also stated “If the dangers of (lawyers’) speech arise from its persuasiveness, from their ability to explain judicial proceedings, or from the likelihood the speech will be believed, these are not the sort of dangers that can validate restrictions. The First Amendment does not permit suppression of speech because of its power to command assent.” (p 1056) You can’t punish the lawyer because he is a smart guy, and might be onto something you don’t like.
Justice Kennedy pointed out that if anything, the first amendment rights of a lawyer speaking about the legal system should be greater, not less than the general public, because the lawyer is in a position to know. (id, 1056).
If the statements are directed mainly at a judge, though these were not, in addition to NY Times and Garrison, above-
While the court acknowledged a state interest in protecting the good repute of judges ” like that of all other public officials,” in Landmark Communications, Inc. vs. Virginia, 435 US 829, 840-43 (1978), it found such interest “an insufficient reason for repressing speech that would otherwise be free.” Id, 841-842 Judges should not be “spared the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are exposed.” Id, 842. “The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of the utmost public concern.” Id, 838-39. This confirmed the observations in Bridges v. California, 314 US 252, 270-71 (1941), that enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, was not a good idea. It confirmed the same observation, that judges have no special status, in NY Times v Sullivan, n. 375, pp. 272-73, even in the face of half truths, and misinformation. Statements criticizing judges may not be punished unless “knowingly false, or one made with reckless disregard of the truth.” Garrison v State of Louisiana, 379 US 64, (1964), citing NY Times.
The flyers here were directed mainly at an entire cartel, naming a local law firm as an example.
Landmark federal case, jewish lawyer accused
In a landmark 1995 federal case in California, jewish lawyer Stephen Yagman told people and wrote that a judge was anti-semitic and dishonest, and acknowledged he had no solid basis, but thought accusing the judge of those things would help keep his clients’ cases out of the judge’s court. In a 2-1 opinion written by jewish judge Alex Kozenski of the US Court of Appeals , after an army of jewish lawyers appeared in the case for Yagman, a two year suspension was reversed, because the views of Yagman were opinion, and did not involve false statements of fact. It also pointed out that the burden of proof should not be on the accused, in any event, in accord with NY Times, and the language of Garrison requiring the accuser to establish the charge. Standing Committee on Disclipine v. Yagman, 55 Fed 3d 1430.
Yagman was later disbarred for unrelated reasons, and Kozenski resigned under pressure in 2017, after multiple complaints by former female law clerks about his conduct.
What about in Israel?
After the Supreme Court jailed a rabbi’s protégé for bribery, the rabbi said publicly:
“These call themselves the Supreme Court? They’re worthless. They should be put in a bottom court. They, for them [God] created all of the torments in the world. Everything that [the people of] Israel suffer from, is just for these evil people. Empty and reckless… What do they know? One of our children of 7–8 years knows better than they how to learn Torah. These are the people who have been put in the Supreme Court. Who chose them, who made them judges, but the Justice Minister, persecuter and enemy he liked them and he recommended that the President would appoint them as judges. What, were there elections? Who says that the nation wants such judges, such evil [ones]… They have no religion and no law. All of them have sex with Niddot (women who are menstruating). All of them desecrate the Sabbath. These will be our judges? Slaves rule over us.”
The Supreme Court declined to put Yosef on trial, because his comments were within his right to freedom of speech.
Contrast to the case at hand, in which a gifted lawyer with a ring side seat used good scholarship and first hand observations.
